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Abstract
This work presents a systemic top-down visualization of Bitcoin transaction activity to explore dynamically gen-
erated patterns of algorithmic behavior. Bitcoin dominates the cryptocurrency markets and presents researchers
with a rich source of real-time transactional data. The pseudonymous yet public nature of the data presents op-
portunities for the discovery of human and algorithmic behavioral patterns of interest to many parties such as
ﬁnancial regulators, protocol designers, and security analysts. However, retaining visual ﬁdelity to the underlying
data to retain a fuller understanding of activity within the network remains challenging, particularly in real time.
We expose an effective force-directed graph visualization employed in our large-scale data observation facility to
accelerate this data exploration and derive useful insight among domain experts and the general public alike.
The high-ﬁdelity visualizations demonstrated in this article allowed for collaborative discovery of unexpected
high frequency transaction patterns, including automated laundering operations, and the evolution of multiple
distinct algorithmic denial of service attacks on the Bitcoin network.
Key words: big data analytics; bitcoin; cryptocurrency; large-scale graph visualization; money laundering;
pattern recognition; structured data
Introduction
Deriving insight into the dense data sets generated by
modern computational and sensing systems is still pri-
marily performed by humans in possession of domain
knowledge and the necessary mathematical and statis-
tical tools. Visualization has also been shown to be an
effective way of gaining insights into the available
data. In that regard, the volume edited by Card et al.1
is still a valuable reference and provides plenty of ex-
amples of such visualizations.
A system of interest, which generates a large amount
of connected data and lacks meaningful systemic visu-
alization tools, is that of Bitcoin.2 This cryptocurrency
system is primarily composed of a permissionless pub-
lic database to which anyone with a tokenized pseu-
donymous identity may write protocol-conformant
data. Since identity is obfuscated through the use of
tokenized addresses, the ability to identify and classify
anomalous patterns of behavior in the data has utility
to many interested parties such as ﬁnancial regulators
(e.g., in the case of money laundering activity) or pro-
tocol developers (in the case of attacks on the system’s
resilience). Conducting an initial graphical observation
is a useful ﬁrst step in the data-analysis workﬂow to in-
vestigate the structural properties of such repeated
anomalous behaviors. We investigated different visual-
izations able to provide this useful exploratory insight
into the underlying behaviors observable in the data.
This article describes the design and development
of tools for dynamically visualizing Bitcoin transac-
tions. The visualizations demonstrated in this article
have enabled the discovery of unexpected transaction
patterns such as money laundering activity and the
observation of several distinct denial of service
attacks on the Bitcoin network. This allowed rapid
understanding among researchers of the structure
of such behavioral patterns for accelerated analysis
and classiﬁcation investigation.
The tools have been successfully deployed in our
data observatory facility:3,4 a high-resolution 64 screen
distributed rendering cluster with a canvas of 132M pix-
els (Fig. 1). We reﬂect upon how the employment of
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such a large-scale observatory environment beneﬁts
more effective data visualization and provides for greater
insight into the data.
Bitcoin Network and Data
Bitcoin, with its inception dating from 2009, is the
dominant cryptocurrency implementation. The sys-
tem is primarily composed of an agreed protocol for
broadcasting exchanges of value between tokenized
participants of a peer-to-peer network. These transac-
tion records are subsequently regularly veriﬁed by
specialist ‘‘mining’’ nodes on the network, whose hon-
esty is ensured through economic jeopardy, and
recorded into a publicly distributed tamperproof led-
ger known as the blockchain. By design, this database
and its updates are public to allow a real-time majority
consensus to form as to the current valid system state.
In this way, through the elegant coupling of cryptogra-
phy with economic incentives, participating pseudo-
nymous strangers are able to establish mutual trust
and conduct secure transactions among themselves
with high conﬁdence.
The raw blockchain database by the end of 2015
stands at *50 GB and contains a continuous record
of the initial minting of every amount of bitcoin and
every subsequent transfer of ownership since the sys-
tem’s inception.
Within the Bitcoin network, several protocol con-
formant data structures are propagated around the
peer-to-peer network using a gossip algorithm. The en-
tire Bitcoin system exists exclusively to create, propa-
gate, verify, and record data structures known as
transactions. A transaction is an atomic record through
which ownership of an amount of bitcoin is transferred
by the current owner to a new owner. A transaction is
composed of 1..n outputs and 0..n inputs. Transaction
outputs are new records of amounts of bitcoin along
with an associated encumbrance to a particular Bitcoin
address, being a representation of the public key com-
ponent of an asymmetric cryptographic challenge sat-
isﬁable only by the new owner. Transaction inputs
are pointers to existing unspent transaction outputs
(UTXO’s) along with a valid proof of the particular
UTXO’s existing cryptographic challenge to veriﬁably
demonstrate ownership. It is only through the provi-
sion of all the input solutions to the cryptographic chal-
lenges that a transaction will be recognized and
recorded by participants as valid, preventing theft. Sim-
ilarly any transaction attempting to reassign ownership
of previously unencumbered amounts (double spend)
or include outputs summing to more than the inputs
(counterfeiting) will be rejected by the majority of hon-
est participants. Each new transaction’s unspent out-
puts can therefore be considered the frontier edge of
a particular tree of spends through the entire transac-
tion graph, rooted at a set of coinbase transactions.
Transactions are broadcast around the network and
each participating node will keep a copy of received
transactions that it considers valid in a data structure
held in volatile memory known as the mempool.
Specialist nodes on the peer-to-peer network known
as miners proceed to select a set of transactions of their
choosing from their own mempool and package them
into a data structure known as a block. By including a
special reward to themselves known as a coinbase
transaction, a miner will generate a block header sum-
marizing this static transaction data set along with
some metadata, including a reference to the previous
valid block. The miner will then set about solving a var-
iable nonce ﬁeld in a sequential brute-force manner
such that the block header’s cryptographic ﬁngerprint
satisﬁes the current network-wide difﬁculty criteria.
Once a miner ﬁnds a winning solution to this lottery
(whose difﬁculty is amended approximately every 2
weeks to result in an average block solution every 10
minutes and the probability of winning such is directly
proportional to the amount of processing power
invested in the lottery), the block is broadcast around
the network to be checked by each node against a set
of validation criteria. If the block and every transaction
contained therein are conformant to the agreed proto-
col, each full node on the network will add the block
to its own independent local copy of the blockchain.
All miners will then commence a new race to solve a
block of the next transaction set. Thus, a network-
wide consensus on the valid system state is reached,
and any node can recreate the current consensus system
state independently.
By its nature, anyone participating in the network
has access to all data in binary form through TCP con-
nections to neighboring nodes. In generating our visu-
alizations, however, we chose to use some of the many
curated and generously free feeds from Bitcoin data
providers, particularly Blockchain.info and Bitno-
des.21.co, using standard RESTful technologies such
as websockets and http requests.
Previous Work and Design Motivations
The granular and public nature of the Bitcoin dataset
presents a unique opportunity for the study of a closed
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economic system at such scale and has already attracted
much analysis. Such analyses have typically focused on
bottom-up approaches to deriving useful information
from the Bitcoin system, either by analyzing individual
address use in the blockchain and inferring clusterings
of ownership/deanonymization5–8 or by relating indi-
vidual transactions directly to infer some associated be-
haviors such as money laundering.9,10 The use of
visualization thus far has been used to a limited extent
solely to present the results of these bottom-up ap-
proaches. The ﬁrst interesting deployment of small-
scale visualization to directly analyze transaction data
in the blockchain is presented by Di Battista et al.,11
which exposes a tool to perform a bottom-up visual
analysis of the inﬂuence of selected source transactions
on subsequent ﬂows in the transaction graph.
With 132M pixels at our disposal, our motivation
was to generate a top-down system-wide visualization
to explain Bitcoin to a lay audience and begin an ex-
plorative analysis of algorithmic patterns of associated
behaviors in the transaction data.
The Bitcoin blockchain, with its canonical ordering
of sequences of transactions and associations between
spending addresses, naturally lends itself to graph visu-
alization and that is the focus of our work. However,
faced with the large size of the full transaction graph
described in Table 1, any visualization effort is forced
to compromise between which discrete subset of data
to visualize and how to abstract away unnecessary de-
tail. Previous bottom-up approaches have achieved this
by restricting the scope of their analyses to identifying a
limited subset of starting points of interest in the block-
chain from which to visualize. Address-based graph
visualizations have typically been separated from
transaction-based graphs. Furthermore, details of the
particular associations in transaction graphs are usually
abstracted away into summary form. Speciﬁcally a
transaction is the only type of node represented in typ-
ical transaction graph visualizations, with its edge asso-
ciations between its inputs and any number of other
transactions and their outputs abstracted to a single-
labeled edge between transaction nodes. While retain-
ing enough information for quantitative analysis, the
visual ﬁdelity to the underlying data is much reduced.
Concretely, visually identifying a transaction with an
unusually large number of outputs or an anomalous
amount of Bitcoin sourced from a previous transaction
becomes an arduous visual operation on textual data in
such abstracted form.
With the full beneﬁt of the large-scale digital canvas
available in our data observatory, our visualization goal
was to remain as faithful to the underlying data as pos-
sible to retain the richest observational insight into the
identiﬁcation of anomalies and patterns of behavior. In
particular, we found it important to retain visual im-
pact regarding the input and output structure of a
transaction, the relative value of transactions, and to
maintain associations between both transactions and
addresses within the scope of a single visualization.
We chose to restrict our subset of blockchain data
based on sequential series of blocks without abstraction.
To layout our graph in a force-directed minimum en-
ergy equilibrium state to visually discern its structure,
we used the continuous ForceAtlas212 algorithm avail-
able in the SigmaJS13 library. The implementation provi-
des for Barnes–Hut optimization familiar to n-body
simulations to reduce the computational complexity
from O(N2) to O(NlogN). To that end, the basic design
of our graph visualization is as follows:
 Transactions are visualized as nodes in a neutral
color whose size is ﬁxed at the value of the current
coinbase reward (25BTC) to give a ﬁxed sense of
scale since the size of input and output nodes is
Table 1. Bitcoin blockchain summary statistics
at the 7th year anniversary of the genesis block
on January 3, 2016
Total bytes: 54,814,349,473
Total blocks: 391,570
Total transactions: 101,533,304
Total inputs: 267,860,693
Total outputs: 301,970,961
Implied UTXO’s: 34,110,268
BTC minted: 15,039,250
Market capitalization @431$/B: $6.48bn
BTC, bitcoin; UTXO, unspent transaction output.
FIG. 1. Bitcoin visualizations presented in a
large-scale data observatory.
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variable depending on value. A transaction node’s
only purpose though is to provide a local focus
for its associated inputs and outputs.
 Inputs are nodes of an orange color whose size is
proportional to its value. They are associated to
their containing transaction by an orange edge.
 Outputs are nodes blue in color whose size is also
proportional to its value. They are associated to
their containing transaction by a blue edge and
if an output should become referenced as an
input in a subsequent transaction within the
scope of the visualization, it is joined to that trans-
action by an orange input edge, thus forming a
chain of spends (Fig. 2).
 Addresses are visualized as a gray associative edge
only if more than one input or output references
the sameaddresswithin the scopeof the visualization.
It can be seen from the stylized representation
shown in Figure 3 that all contextual and association
information from the transaction data structure can
be visualized in one graph and thus any amounts,
structures of individual transactions, high-frequency
chains of spends, or address associations of an anoma-
lous nature will be immediately apparent by visual
inspection.
Visualizing Bitcoin Transactions
We now take our transaction representation and
apply it to an animated graph whose layout evolves
in real time to visualize transactions and their associ-
ations as they are broadcast into the network and join
all peers’ mempools. Furthermore, we apply the same
animated force-directed visualization to explore indi-
vidual blocks of static data laid out on request to ex-
plore past behaviors. To gently introduce a lay
audience to some of the abstract concepts of Bitcoin,
we also produced a global visual manifestation of
the activity on the peer-to-peer network, less intimi-
dating in its complexity.
Mempool Visualization
The aim of this animated visualization* (e.g., Fig. 4A)
was to demonstrate the current activity and degree of
connectivity as transactions enter the mempool in real
time through a continuously updated force-directed
graph layout. By interacting with the Bitcoin network
through known stained addresses, it is also possible to
conduct an active data analysis by identifying one’s
own transactions and the network’s responses.
Independent transactions are visually associated to
each other in two ways: either directly through an exist-
ing output becoming an input to a new transaction
within the timeframe of the visualization or indirectly
through the reuse of the same cryptographic public
key within an element of a transaction, which we con-
nect with a gray edge.
Interacting with the visualization is simple. We pro-
vide for pan, zoom, and hover over methods to display
uncluttered textual data such as transaction references
and address information. We facilitate further detailed
data analysis by highlighting connected components
along with the ability to transmit such subcomponent
data in JSON by PeerJS to hand-held tablet displays for
amore detailed, localized analysis directly linked to online
Bitcoin exploration tools such as blockchain.info. Filter-
ing the visualized data set by amount, address, or refer-
ence is also possible from the hand-held tablet display.
The current Bitcoin transaction rate under normal
circumstances is around 2–3 per second. A typical sim-
ple transaction, as shown in Figure 4B, will be rendered
in our visualization with four vertices (the transaction,
an input, a spending output, and an output back to the
current owner for an amount of change). Considering
more sophisticated transactions with many inputs
FIG. 2. Visualizing a simple chain of spends in
the mempool with blue outputs from one
transaction becoming orange inputs to the next,
from a source coinbase transaction in red.
FIG. 3. Stylized transaction visualization
sourcing ﬁve equal input amounts from a single
address and paying 25BTC to a new address.
*A low resolution video demonstrating the system can be found at: https://
imperialcollegelondon.app.box.com/v/bitcoinVis
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and/or outputs, data are rendered into our graph at a
rate of around 500–1000 new vertices per minute,
allowing a manageable real-time layout and visually
clear rendering using standard web technologies. This
enables scalability to explore historical transactions.
We store an index of the 2000 latest transactions in a
circular buffer, which when full removes the oldest
transactions from the visualization on a First-In–First-
Out basis. Transactions are also removed from this visu-
alization should they be included in any block as it is
broadcast into the network. In this way, computational
load in rendering the layout is continuously managed
such that the number of nodes in the visualization is
never more than around 10,000 (given the multiple in-
puts and outputs associated with each transaction).
Blockchain Visualization
This visualization is similar in nature to the mempool,
but provides the ability to visually explore any indi-
vidual block mined into the blockchain. It allows the
visual recognition of recurring patterns within the av-
erage 10-minute timeframe of a block. Examples of
this visualization are shown in Figures 4 and 5. Special
coinbase transactions rewarding miners (which are
not broadcast in the network and thus inapplicable
to the mempool visualization) have no source inputs
since they are newly minted coins and are visualized
here in red.
Expanded later in this article, this visualization has
allowed us to detect anomalous high-frequency behav-
ioral patterns within the Bitcoin transaction graph and
demarcate a period of artiﬁcial network stress into two
distinct and independent behaviors that were previ-
ously hidden in the dense raw dataset.
Building on previous analysis,10 section 3.5 ‘‘Use
Cases’’ of Di Battista et al.11 used visualization to reveal
two anomalous transactions at the apex of a money
laundering operation, but did not identify them by refer-
ence. Figure 5 shows the ease with which our tool allows
immediate visual identiﬁcation of these transactions,
given knowledge only of their anomalous nature.
Peer Visualization
The aim of this simple rotating globe visualization,
shown in Figure 6, was to demonstrate the global
scope of the peer-to-peer network and bring to life
areas of activity. Knowledge of network topology is not
only important to ensure network robustness and efﬁ-
cient data propagation but also to determine which
nodes may have an advantage and which attacks on
the system may be feasible.14,15
A Bitcoin Core node cold booting into the P2P net-
work embarks on a process of network discovery through
the use of hardcoded DNS servers; it subsequently
maintains knowledge of up to 2000 peers in its local
FIG. 4. (A) High-resolution (8k) visualization of a
standard block; (B) detail of both a low (small
node) and a high (large node) value transaction,
(C) known and linked Bitcoin addresses, (D) a
payout system, and (E) a highly associated
disconnected component believed to be a
coin-tumbling service to move amounts rapidly
between addresses, obfuscating the source and
destination of funds.
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addrMan database through the gossip of ADDR mes-
sages despite only initiating a maximum of eight ac-
tual peer connections.
The vast majority of peers on the network are behind
ﬁrewalls/NATs, and therefore maintain their network
presence solely through their eight outgoing connec-
tions alone, while rejecting all incoming connection re-
quests. By recursively attempting ingoing connection
attempts to all endpoints observed in the exchange of
ADDR messages, it is possible to spider through the
subset of nodes forming the backbone network of
contactable peers. We use the data derived from one
such public crawler16 and its MaxMind legacy GeoIP da-
tabase to geolocate all currently contactable Bitcoin
peers, which typically number between 5000 and 6000
nodes, and plot them on the Google Data Arts Team’s
open platform ‘‘WebGL-Globe’’.
Using data from Blockchain.info (which provides
transaction messages, including the IP address of the
ﬁrst peer that the Blockchain.info supernode is aware
to have relayed the transaction), we then increment
the columnar representation corresponding to the par-
ticular IP address by one unit to indicate the transac-
tional activity.
We have found that this visualization greatly aids in
the lay explanation of a peer-to-peer overlay network
and the global nature of Bitcoin infrastructure and its
activity. In this case, however, the transactional insight
the visualization provides is of limited value since it is
dependent on the particular latencies and connections
of the Blockchain.info supernode. With the addition of
topological data derived from Miller et al.14 and timing
data frommultiple triangulation nodes, it could prove a
useful tool for monitoring network robustness and
threats in real time.
FIG. 5. Visualizing blocks#199884,232304,
previously reported as containing anomalous yet
unidentiﬁed transactions at the apex of a money
laundering operation,21 demonstrating ease of
visual search and hover-over interaction for
isolation and further analysis.
FIG. 6. Global visualization of contactable
nodes and transaction activity on the Bitcoin
peer-to-peer network.
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Analysis of a Denial of Service Attack
While conducting this work and exploring themempool
on a daily basis over the summer of 2015, a sustained at-
tack upon the Bitcoin network became immediately vis-
ible and warranted further investigation:
A long-running source of disagreement within the Bit-
coin community is the arbitrary 1MB limit on the size of a
block.Originally implemented to prevent certain denial of
service attacks, it prevents the system from scaling beyond
a transaction rate of only around four transactions per
second. In 2015, unknown actors took it upon themselves
to automatically generate economically insigniﬁcant
spam transactions, in an effort to artiﬁcially increase the
data rate and seemingly press home the need to raise
the 1 MB limit. By visualizing these transactions mined
into blocks over that period, it is possible to make several
observations of interest.
The attack started with a sudden increase in the
transaction rate with the formation of ‘‘parasitic worm’’
structures in the visualization due to the algorithmic
high-frequency division of Bitcoin into tiny amounts to
the same set of addresses, shown in Figure 7.
FIG. 7. Blocks#364133,364618: Initial ‘‘parasitic
worm’’ transaction rate attack.
FIG. 8. Blocks#364281,364292: Initial
algorithmic responses to spam, the lower block
showing the largest possible transaction.
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Processing this volume of transactions occupied net-
work resources and caused a degradation in the service
of regular transactions. The attack’s effects were ampli-
ﬁed by the use of addresses with very low entropy dic-
tionary private keys such as ‘‘cat’’ or ‘‘password1’’.
Similar in nature to throwing a handful of dollar bills
into a crowded room, we quickly observed the algorith-
mic scramble to collect these multiple small amounts of
Bitcoin, including the mining of the largest possible
single transaction at 1 MB in Figure 8.
This transaction rate attack forming the parasitic
worm structures persisted across many blocks. It caused
delays in the processing of all transactions and a backlog
of transactions in the mempool pending veriﬁcation.
FIG. 9. Network statistics showing the change froma transaction rate attack to the two-phaseddatadensity attack.
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However, even after the transaction rate returned to nor-
mal, it was evident that the network was still under du-
ress. Figure 9 shows the sudden single increase in
transaction rate, but only on inspection of the average
block size does it become apparent that a second attack
occurred in quick succession, the nature of which was
data density rather than transaction rate.
This second attack occurred in two phases as shown
by the change in gradient of the number of records in
the UTXO set in Figure 9. The attack had a limited im-
pact on the backlog of transactions in the mempool, but
a very pernicious effect on the number of UTXOs. By
studying the block visualizations over this period, we
can see that a very different algorithm was used, gener-
ating a ‘‘cancerous tumor’’ structure. This attack is very
much one of data density rather than transaction rate
and probably conducted by an entirely separate second
party. It is also obvious to note the point at which a sim-
ple constant parameter in the algorithmwas amended to
increase the data density of this attack in its second
phase, shown in Figure 10.
Many of these insights arose from collaborative dis-
cussions among multidisciplinary researchers within
the immersive visualization environment of the data
observatory, which allowed the details of these visuali-
zations to be interrogated as a group.
Beneﬁts of High-Resolution Visualization
of the Bitcoin System
At current transaction rates, each block visualization
typically contains a minimum totaling 5000 vertices
(although it is not rare to get >20,000 in busy periods).
This is where the advantage of rendering into a high-
deﬁnition large-scale observatory proves its worth.
Not only is the human visual system able to easily dis-
cern the associated patterns of behavior observable in
the data but one can also physically approach the detail
in the data and conduct a ﬁne-grained analysis of one
particular anomaly, while maintaining the context of
the whole picture. Crucially, conducting these investi-
gative discussions as part of a team of collaborators
has been found to be most useful, especially when
able to simply turn one’s head to make comparative ob-
servations across multiple blocks simultaneously.
The graph visualizations described in this article main-
tain only minimal utility on a desktop screen during peri-
odswhere the number of vertices increases beyond 10,000.
Such periods in fact occur frequently, for instance after a
long delay between the mining of blocks or of a massively
increased transaction rate due to artiﬁcial network stress.
In our case, this high-resolution large-scale visuali-
zation has proven to have some additional beneﬁts:
 Introducing the whole Bitcoin system to the general
public, given its abstract nature, is no simple task. By
exposing all of the system’s tightly coupled compo-
nents on the display at once, explanation and group
discussion have been greatly facilitated. The visualiza-
tions have also shown their educational worth hav-
ing been used on national television17 to materialize
FIG. 10. Blocks#367409,368580 from 29th July to
6th August 2015 show two distinct phases of the
second data density-based ‘‘tumor’’ attack, note
obvious change in algorithm parameterization to
increase density.
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some of the abstract concepts of Bitcoin and explain
associated blockchain technologies.
 High-frequency algorithmic behaviors previously
hidden in the dense data set became immediately
obvious and differentiable, greatly accelerating
further initial investigation employing machine
learning/pattern recognition techniques.
 Collaborative academic discussion of the Bitcoin
system and its observed behaviors within the Obser-
vatory space among both lay practitioners and ex-
perts has enriched researcher’s decision-making
processes as to where to concentrate their efforts.
Given the nature of the Bitcoin data set described
above, we do not doubt that these additional beneﬁts
would largely be absent without the high pixel density
canvas and exploratory space afforded by the big data
visualization tool presented in this study. We also be-
lieve that these beneﬁts are transferable to other big
data problems.
Evaluation of the Effectiveness
of the Bitcoin Visualization
To determine the effectiveness of this visualization of
the Bitcoin system, observations were made on the var-
ious visiting groups to the Data Observatory, totaling
over 900 people. Among the general public were visit-
ing executives from companies, visiting researchers in
various ﬁelds, as well as researchers from departments
based at Imperial College.
Almost all visitors had heard of Bitcoin and recog-
nized it as a currency. Aided by the peer visualization,
almost all visitors recognized the mempool visualization
as representing all global transactions, rather than a lim-
ited subset. Upon explanation of the visual representa-
tion of a transaction, they were able to understand the
layout of the linking between transactions far more
clearly than the raw data, and the majority of people
were then able to spot anomalous patterns in the visual-
ization and question their signiﬁcance based on oral
feedback after the initial presentation.
For visiting executives, the conversations tended to-
ward questioning the anonymity of the data to ascer-
tain the feasibility of tracking transactions across time
to determine their origin. They were able to identify
the majority of formed structures, although generally
were more interested in the ability to apply the visual-
ization to alternative ﬁnancial transactions.
For researchers from different ﬁelds, a large number
of observations were made about the resemblance to
areas in their areas of expertise. In particular, those
in medical and biological ﬁelds made reference to the
visual similarities between the network attacks and par-
asitic organisms. Again, there was ease in the recogni-
tion of structures as well as the ability to identify them
in further block illustrations.
The greatest beneﬁt, however, was to researchers both
internal and external speciﬁcally working in the ﬁeld of
cryptocurrencies. As with previous groups, the large
size of the visualization allowed viewing as a group rather
than an individual, but in addition, the ability to identify
an individual transaction in a block that might contain
several thousand. This can be then recorded for later
study or investigatedwithin the space. The ability to iden-
tify large transactions, as well as identify the patterns for
hostile algorithms, coin-tumbling services, payment
services, and otherwise unknown transaction patterns
allowed for continuing research.
Conclusions
This article presents the development of tools to gain an
exploratory understanding of associated patterns of
behavior in the densely connected dataset of all Bitcoin
transactions. Compared to previous bottom-up ap-
proaches exploring data from singular source transac-
tions, our approach has been to generate a top-down
system-wide visualization enabling pattern detection
subsequently allowing drilled-down detail into any
transaction. Furthermore, we have shown how we com-
bine both the transaction and address graphs into one
high-ﬁdelity visualization of associations.
Precisely, these visualizations have elegantly revealed
the structure of the recurring high-frequency patterns
of an algorithmic denial of service attack on the Bitcoin
system and revealed previously hidden insights into the
multiple distinct phases of such attack. Identiﬁcation
and classiﬁcation of such observable patterns of behav-
ior among other recurring patterns such as money
laundering have provided useful kernels for analysis
and discussion among multidisciplinary researchers.
In brief, the described visualizations have proven their
usefulness for three distinct purposes: (1) understanding
transaction patterns, (2) collaboratively evaluating and
exploring these patterns with groups of experts, and (3)
providing an introductory educational primer on the
operation of the Bitcoin system to the general public.
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